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ABSTRACT 
Lack of usability of security Application Programming In- 
terfaces (APIs) is one of the main reasons for mistakes that 
programmers make that result in security vulnerabilities in 
software applications they develop. Especially, APIs that pro- 
vide cryptographic functionalities such as password hashing 
are sometimes too complex for programmers to learn and use. 
To improve the usability of these APIs to make them easy to 
learn and use, it is important to identify the usability issues 
exist on those APIs that make those harder to learn and use. 
In this work, we evaluated the usability of SCrypt password 
hashing functionality of Bouncycastle API to identify usabil- 
ity issues in it that persuade programmers to make mistakes 
while developing applications that would result in security 
vulnerabilities. We conducted a study with 10 programmers 
where each of them spent around 2 hours for the study and 
attempted to develop a secure password storage solution us- 
ing Bouncycastle API. From data we collected, we identified 
63 usability issues that exist in the SCrypt implementation 
of Bouncycastle API. Results of our study provided useful 
insights about how security/cryptographic APIs should be 
designed, developed and improved to provide a better experi- 
ence for programmers who use them. Furthermore, we expect 
that this work will provide a guidance on how to conduct 
usability evaluations for security APIs to identify usability 
issues exist in them. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In 2017 December, a group of researchers discovered a data- 
base on dark web that contains 1.4 billion user-names and 
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passwords in clear text [7]. We are hearing similar incidents 
of password leaks every now and then [7, 9]. Even though so 
many advanced technologies have been introduced to secure 
passwords from hackers, still hackers have been successful 
in conducting attacks and stealing user passwords. One of 
the main reasons for this is developers, who develop the 
applications and responsible for the security of passwords, 
are making mistakes while developing applications, which 
results in making password stores accessible to hackers. Due 
to such issues caused by developers, researchers have called 
the developer as the enemy of cyber security [15]. 
Storing user login data and authenticating users is one of 
the most common tasks carried out by software developers 
[10]. At the same time, this task is prone to security issues 
due to the high complexity of the technologies and concepts 
involved in this process [6]. Most developers have been identi- 
fied to store passwords and other login details insecurely due 
to their lack of expertise in these security related concepts 
and technologies [10]. 
One of the possible solutions to solve this problem is to 
make the libraries and Application Programming Interfaces 
(APIs), which provide such security related functionalitties, 
easy to use for programmers by improving their usability [15]. 
However, researchers have been often blaming such APIs, 
which we call as security APIs or crypto APIs, as less usable 
and difficult to use correctly by programmers [6]. 
Therefore, in this study, we are evaluating the usability 
of the password hashing functionality provided in one of the 
most popular cryptographic APIs that provides cryptographic 
functionalities such as password hashing, Bouncycastle API . 
Bouncycastle is an open source library that implements cryp- 
tographic functionalities and exposes them to programmers 
to use through an API. Usability issues exist in such security 
APIs force non security expert programmers to use the APIs 
incorrectly and result in introducing security vulnerabilities 
to applications they develop. To improve the usability of 
APIs, it is important to understand what programmers ex- 
pect from APIs and why API implementations have failed to 
meet programmer expectations. In this work, by observing 
programmers who use Bouncycastle API to implement a se- 
cure password storage, we attempt to identify usability issues 
exist in the API that persuade programmers to insecurely 
store passwords. Following is the research question that we 
are trying to answer in this work. 
● What are the usability issues exist in password hashing 
functionality of Bouncycastle API that make program- 
mers incorrectly use the API and how those issues 
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affect security of the applications that programmers 
develop? 
To answer this question, we conducted a qualitative exper- 
imental study with 10 participants where each participant 
spent about 2 hours for the study. In this experiment, we 
used cognitive dimensions questionnaire based methodology 
[14] and think aloud method [13] to identify usability issues 
of the API that programmers experienced. From the data we 
gathered, we identified useful insights about usability issues 
exist in Bouncycastle API. Following are some of the key 
usability concerns of the API that we identified. 
● Difficulty in identifying correct parameters to use in 
API method invocation. 
● Difficulty in using the API correctly without a previous 
knowledge on security concepts such as salt. 
● Poor documentation. 
● Lack of examples. 
We believe the knowledge obtained in this study will help 
to develop more usable security APIs in the future and will 
guide developers to improve the usability of existing security 
APIs. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews pre- 
vious related research. Section 3 describes the experiment 
methodology and section 4 presents the results of the study. 
Then we discuss the impacts of usability issues we identified 
in this study to the security of applications before concluding 
the paper. 
 
2 RELATED WORK 
The relationship between the usability of security APIs and 
security of end user applications that use those security APIs 
has become a topic of high interest among researchers recently 
[1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 14] . There have been several studies that discuss 
and investigate this relationship. 
By emphasizing that programmers are not security experts, 
Wurster and van Oorschot argue that improving usability of 
tools and APIs that programers use is important to minimize 
the mistakes they do while developing applications [15]. Acar 
et al. [1] also highlight the importance of the usability of 
security APIs by pointing that programmers who make use 
of security APIs are not experts of security. Mindermann [8] 
argues that security of an application will be far better if the 
libraries used to develop that application are more usable. 
He stresses the importance of applying usability research for 
security APIs to deliver more usable security APIs. 
Even though the importance of the usability of security 
APIs has been identified and discussed [1, 2, 8, 15], not much 
work has been done to evaluate the usability of security APIs. 
Gorski and Iacono [5] presented 11 characteristics that need 
to be considered when evaluating the usability of security 
APIs. Green and Smith [6] introduced 10 rules for developing 
usable security APIs. By considering these 2 sets of guidelines 
and by referring to previous work done on usability evaluation 
of general APIs, Wijayarathna et al. [14] presented a cognitive 
dimensions framework, which consists of 15 dimensions to be 
used in the usability evaluation of security APIs. The only 
current work on empirically evaluating usability of security 
APIs are done by Acar et al. [1] where they evaluated and 
compared usability of 5 cryptographic APIs for python. 
There are several studies that investigate the programmer 
behavior related to password storage. By doing an empirical 
investigation on password storage behaviours of program- 
mers, Naiakshina et al.[10] revealed some interesting insights 
about the password storage behaviour of developers such 
as security knowledge does not guarantee secure password 
storage. In a study conducted by Acar et al. [2] to evaluate 
the effectiveness of recruiting participants through Github 
for security developer studies, they have used a password 
storage task and they have observed that some participants 
stored passwords as plain text. Authors have observed that 
this insecure behaviour does not depend on their self reported 
security knowledge. 
However, so far there has been no study that investigates 
usability issues of cryptographic APIs that persuade program- 
mers to make mistakes while working with user passwords. 
Our work attempts to fill this gap by studying programmers 
who use Bouncycastle crypto API to secure passwords and 
by identifying usability issues of the API. 
 
 
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
The study was designed to identify issues that programmers 
face as well as to observe how those issues affect them while 
they are using Bouncycastle API for implementing secure 
password storage solutions. This study was approved by the 
Human Research Ethic Committee of our university. 
Conducting a user study is a widely known method for 
identifying usability issues of APIs [1, 14]. To conduct a 
user study, first we had to design a programming task for 
participants to follow. Even though Boucycastle provides 
numerous password hashing algorithm implementations, it is 
not practical to evaluate all these functionalities in a single 
study. On the other hand, Naiakshina et al. [10] observed 
that programmers are not good at selecting secure algorithms 
to use in password hashing.Therefore, we decided to inform 
participants on which algorithm to use and we decided to 
use SCrypt algorithm [11] as it was the most secure algo- 
rithm implementation available in Bouncycastle at the time 
we conducted the experiment. However, we observed that 
results we obtained are relevant to other hashing algorithms 
of Bouncycastle as well, as these different implementations 
have lots of similarities in the design. 
In the task, we provided participants with a simple web 
application that includes functionalities for registering users 
and login users. A user can register for the application by 
providing a username and a password. Once the registration 
is completed, user can login to the web application with the 
username and the password. In the web application that we 
provided for the participants, we stored passwords as plain 
text and we asked participants to secure passwords using 
SCrypt implementation of the Bouncycastle API. 
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We recruited programmers with Java experience from 
Github to participate in the study. We used Github to re- 
cruit participants  rather than  recruiting participants from 
university or local software development firms, to get a more 
diverse sample of programmers. This is a widely accepted 
and used method among researchers to recruit participants to 
developer studies [1, 2]. Furthermore, recruiting participants 
from Github helps to get participants with more experience 
in software development, which improves the ecological va- 
lidity of the study. We extracted publicly available email 
addresses of Java developers with significant contributions 
to Java projects and sent emails inviting them to partici- 
pate in our study. We offered them with a $15 Amazon gift 
voucher as a token of appreciation for the participation. In 
the invitation email, we included a link to sign up for the 
study. Furthermore, we informed them that participation is 
voluntary and participants can withdraw from the study at 
any time. Once people signed up, we filtered out those who 
did not have any software development experience since our 
target sample for the study was software developers. Further- 
more, we filtered out participants with no experience in using 
Java because if a participant faces issues with programming 
language while completing the task, we may not be able to 
clearly identify the usability issues of the API s/he had come 
up with. Sign up form required participants to enter their 
name and email address, which were required to send study 
material to them. However, such personally identifiable infor- 
mation of the participants were removed from the final data 
set which we used for the analysis. A total of 10 participants 
participated in the study. 
Once each participant signed up by completing the sign up 
form and consented to participate in the study, we sent them 
details of the programming task to do and code artefacts to 
use. Participants completed the task remotely on their own 
computers and we suggested them to complete the task in a 
time comfortable to them. We requested them to think-aloud 
[13] and record their screens with voice (so thinkaloud results 
will be recorded) while completing the task. By collecting 
participant think-aloud results, we expected to identify issues 
they experience by observing their thought process. Once 
a participant completed the task, s/he was asked to send 
his/her source code with the video recording to us through 
email. Participants spent an average of 44.32 minutes in 
completing the task. Then each participant had to complete 
the cognitive dimensions questionnaire [14] which we shared 
with them via Google forms. 
Once we finished the data collection, analysis was done 
manually by one analyst. We used manual analysis since our 
data set was small[3]. Questionnaire answers were analysed 
prior to analysing videos and identified usability issues that 
exist in Bouncycastle API from questionnaire responses. After 
analysing questionnaire answers, recordings were analysed to 
identify the usability issues that each participant encountered. 
Then, those were analysed to identify how usability issues 
that were identified, affected the participants for securely 
completing the task. Special attention was given to decisions 
made by participants that caused to reduce the security of 
programmes they developed. 
 
4 STUDY RESULTS 
From the analysis, we could identify a total of 63 issues in the 
SCrypt implementation of Bouncycastle. Each participant 
had reported an average of approximately 15 usability issues. 
From here onward, we are looking at issues that were expe- 
rienced by most number of participants and those that had 
an effect in the security of the password storages developed 
by the participants. Furthermore, we have logically divided 
the identified issues into several categories for the ease of 
presentation and discussion. 
For the ease of presentation, we labelled participants with 
labels P1, P2,.., P10. They will be referred with this label 
from here onward. Statements made by participants that are 
presented in this section were not corrected for any gram- 
matical errors and are presented as those were stated. 
 
4.1 Selecting method parameters for SCrypt 
generate method invocation 
Bouncycastle API exposes its SCrypt hashing functional- 
ity with a static method "generate()" of SCrypt class. This 
method takes 6 parameters, which are password as a byte ar- 
ray, salt value as a byte array, CPU/Memory cost parameter, 
blocksize in use for underlying hash, parallelization parame- 
ter and the length of the key to generate . The strength of 
the password storage depends on the values that program- 
mer uses for these parameters. If the programmer uses weak 
values for these parameters, security of the password storage 
will be weak and it will be vulnerable to attacks. 
Most of the participants of the study identified that using 
correct values for these parameters is important to ensure 
security. 7/10 participants mentioned this in their response 
to the questionnaire and mentioned that if they used incor- 
rect values, it would negatively impact the security of their 
solution. P7 mentioned that "Application would be secure if 
I used the appropriate values for the parameters N, P and 
R. For example if N is very small I realized that the pro- 
cessing is faster but I suppose it would be easier to hack the 
password". However, understanding these parameters and 
selecting correct values for these parameters were not that 
easy and some of our participants blamed the API for not 
providing sufficient help for this. 
Some participants (P1, P2, P4, P5, P7, P8, P9) found 
it difficult to understand what these parameters mean and 
found it difficult to interpret them. Furthermore, participants 
mentioned that parameters are too low level and it was dif- 
ficult to find required details about those parameters that 
are required to use the API. Participants reported this in 
their questionnaire responses as well as we could observe this 
in their think aloud results. While completing the task, we 
could observe these thoughts from P2 - "What is paralleliza- 
tion? What does parallelization does? I’m thinking what does 
parallelization use for. It would make sense if I would read 
some stuff about SCrypt in the web. For now, let’s try to 
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(a) Suggestions shown in Integrated Development Environ- 
ment for method parameters 
 
 
(b) Method parameter names used in Bouncycastle SCrypt 
source code 
 
 
(c) Java API documentation of SCrypt.generate() method 
 
Figure 1: Examples of non-explanatory variable names ob- 
served by participants 
 
 
guess what is happening. Not a good thing to guess when you 
are doing security". However, in a good API, programmers 
are supposed to understand what a class/method/variable 
does just by looking at its name, which has not been the case 
here. 
API Java docs or the Integrated Development Environ- 
ment(IDE)’s suggestions also did not gave any help for pro- 
grammers to understand these parameters as they show sin- 
gle letter non-explanatory variables. API source code which 
can be accessed through internet also uses non-explanatory 
variable names. Figure 1 shows some of the places where par- 
ticipants observed non-explanatory variable names of method 
parameters that made it difficult for them to interpret mean- 
ing and use of those parameters. P7 mentioned in his response 
to the questionnaire that "It was difficult to find the details 
of the API while you are using it. programming IDE suggests 
using the API with unclear input argument names (arg1, arg2, 
etc.)". 
Most participants mentioned that selecting values for these 
parameters as the hardest part of using the API. Even par- 
ticipants who could understand the use of parameters also 
found it difficult to identify proper values to use as parame- 
ter values. Participants urged that API should provide some 
guidance to select values for parameters when calling the 
SCrypt.generate() function. We observed their frustration in 
their think aloud results as well as in post experiment survey 
feedback. P8 while trying to identify proper values for param- 
eters said that "CPU memory cost parameter, I have no idea 
how to choose this number, [..], Block size must be greater 
than 1, if 100 is okay or 1000, I don’t know". Furthermore, 
participants suggested that if the API and its documentation 
can provide information about the relationship between the 
values used for parameters and strength of produced hash as 
well as relationship between the values used for parameters 
and performance of the algorithm, it would make the life of 
the programmer less difficult. 
Participants also hinted some solutions that would reduce 
the difficulties programmers face while choosing parameter 
values. Some participants (P4, P5, P7, P9) suggested that 
SCrypt class should provide an overloaded generate() method 
which only takes password or password and salt as method 
parameters. For example, P7 suggested that "Maybe add 
another method that masks the call to Scrypt’s generate () 
method using default values for N, P, and R". It might not 
be possible to provide functionalities in the exact way that 
participants have suggested here. However, this suggests that 
there is a clear mismatch between what programmers expect 
and what the API has provided. 
Participants also suggested to use more high-level objects 
for method parameters that enforce constraints associated 
with each parameter, rather than using primitive Java int 
type. P10 explained this saying "The method only uses prim- 
itive types for its arguments. This is pretty low level. Only 
the documentation gives a hint on what subset of integers 
are valid. Real objects as arguments could provide much bet- 
ter documentation and make their usage much more obvious. 
Some restrictions are given in the documentation as formulas, 
these restrictions could be coded in the argument types.". 
 
 
4.2 Using salt with SCrypt.generate() method 
Salt is also a parameter of the SCrypt.generate() method, but 
it is different from cost parameters we discussed in previous 
sub sections and serves a different purpose. Usage of salt pro- 
vides protection against dictionary attacks and pre-computed 
rainbow attacks. In study results, we observed that different 
ways programmers followed to use salt affected the security 
of password storage solutions they developed. 
Even though most of the participants identified that values 
they select for cost parameters would affect the security of 
their solution, we observed that they did not feel the same 
about the salt value they used. Interestingly, most of the 
participants used a constant salt among all the users of their 
application. We observed that this was mainly a result of their 
lack of knowledge on the salt concept and their confidence 
about their knowledge which made them believe that they 
are doing the right thing. They did not seem to knew that 
they were doing something bad as it was not reflected in 
their thoughts. P8 created 2 users with same password and 
observed that both get the same hash, still did not identify 
it as a problem. 
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Interestingly, API did not give any guidance for the par- 
ticipants to avoid false uses such as using constant strings 
as the salt. It has been acknowledged that usable security 
APIs should be possible to use by programmers correctly and 
securely, even without a previous knowledge of security con- 
cepts. However, it was appeared that the API has assumed 
that programmers who will use the API would already be 
knowledgeable about relevant concepts and would use salt as 
expected by API developers. Some participants (P1, P4, P5, 
P8) also stressed that Bouncycastle API should give proper 
guidance about how to use the salt when using this func- 
tionality. Furthermore, participants suggested that the API 
should provide recommendations on the length of the salt 
to be used. P8 mentioned in his think aloud results that "I 
know what the salt means, I can just put any random number 
there, well, we got to know if there should be any criteria for 
choosing that byte array". 
 
4.3 Issues observed about the documentation of 
Bouncycastle API 
Documentation is an integral part of any API and it has a 
huge effect on the experience that programmers have with an 
API. In Bouncycastle API documentation also, there were 
few issues that participants experienced and suggested that 
could have been fixed to improve the usability of the API. 
We observed that participants were referring to unreliable 
third party sources and tutorials rather than referring to 
official documentation, which is considered more reliable[4]. 
We observed that participants were referring to Stackover- 
flow to get help about using the API and also for making 
security critical decisions such as selecting values for method 
parameters. Apparently, it was observed that most details 
about the parameter selection and recommendations for the 
parameters were only available in Stackoverflow. 
After completing the task, some participants (P1, P4, P5, 
P7) mentioned  that  there  was  no  enough  documentation 
to refer. P4 mentioned that "Not much documentation for 
this class [SCrypt] and very few examples in the internet for 
this API ". Furthermore, we observed that participants found 
it difficult to find documentation and tutorials about the 
SCrypt implementation that they had to use. They blamed 
that there were no proper link from the Bouncycastle website 
to the API documentation and they said that information 
was difficult to find. P7 mentioned in his think aloud output 
that "This looks simple to use, The problem is that I do not 
have the documentation or I can’t find the documentation". 
Participants also mentioned that there was no enough 
examples on how to use the SCrypt functionality of the API. 
P5 mentioned in his response to the questionnaire that "The 
biggest problem was finding an example of how to use the 
required part of the API. I could not find examples in the API 
site and had to refer to user groups on the web for detail." 
We made another interesting observation when participants 
search for "Bouncycastle SCrypt" in Google , where results 
from third party sources such as Stackoverflow appeared 
before sources from Bouncycastle. This encouraged some 
participants to refer to solutions provided in Stackoverflow 
before looking at official documentation. It has been acknowl- 
edged previously that referring to third party sources such as 
Stackoverflow can negatively affect the security of programs 
that are developed [4] and what we observed with Google 
search results encouraged that negative behavior. We also 
observed that some of the Stackoverflow posts that were re- 
ferred by participants even had compile errors in the available 
code, which made their life much harder. This observation 
suggests that it is important to list official sources in the top 
of Google results before other third party sources. It would be 
an interesting thing to explore whether there is a significant 
relationship between the order of Google search results and 
the security of applications developed by programmers. 
 
4.4 Usage of byte array vs String to store 
passwords 
Using Java char arrays to store passwords is recommended 
over using Strings to store passwords, because while using 
Strings, password will be stored in the memory for longer and 
cannot be deleted until garbage collector clears them. Because 
of this, cryptographic API methods such as SCrypt.generate() 
use char arrays and byte arrays as the variable type for 
passwords. 
However, participants were not very pleased to use byte 
arrays as they preferred to use String over byte array. P5 
suggested that "The API used byte arrays which are similar 
to Strings. Again,a String overload would have been a nice 
addition.". However, what programmers expected was not 
the most secure option and it would compromise the secu- 
rity. We identified this as a place where usability has been 
compromised to provide better security. It would be useful 
to explore whether these programmer expectations can be 
fulfilled without compromising the security. 
Furthermore, we observed that some participants (P2, P4, 
P8, P10) used String to save passwords in their applications 
before using the hashing function and only converted it to 
byte array for the hashing step. Even though the API has 
taken measures to prevent programmers from using String, 
it has not been successful as these details have not been 
properly communicated to the programmer. This suggests 
that providing more explanation on security  details with 
API documentation would help to prevent programmers from 
taking insecure decisions, which will enhance the security of 
the applications they develop. 
 
4.5 Other observed issues 
Bouncycastle provides password hashing functionality with 
SCrypt algorithm through the generate() static method of 
the SCrypt class. Even though, this method is static, API 
allowed programmers to instantiate SCrypt objects. Being 
able to instantiate the class and then the  method  being 
static confused some programmers. P7 described his confusion 
saying "I have a confusion initially because I create an object 
of class Scrypt, but later I see that the method generate() was 
static. The Scrypt class should have private constructor." 
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5 DISCUSSION 
While our main intention of this study was to identify usabil- 
ity issues of the Bouncycastle SCrypt implementation, we 
observed some interesting insights about the security usability 
relationship, specially in the API context. 
There are several studies on how method parameters of 
API methods affect the experience of programmers [12]. How- 
ever, not much emphasis is given to how it would affect the 
security of end user applications that use the API when such 
design decisions go on the bad way. Previous research has 
discussed that factors such as "error proneness" or "lack of 
documentation" can affect the security of end user applica- 
tions that use a security API. Our results show that usability 
issues of more primitive level, such as issues related to ab- 
straction level of the security API can also affect the security 
of end user applications that use the API. This emphasizes 
and highlights the importance of improving usability of secu- 
rity APIs to prevent security vulnerabilities in applications 
that make use of those APIs. 
Our results also highlight the importance of designing 
security APIs such as Bouncycastle for programmers who 
are not security experts. We observed how programmers 
without proper knowledge of salt could misuse the API to 
develop a solution that is not secure. Previous research has 
highlighted a lot that developers who use security APIs such 
as Bouncycastle are not security experts and it is important 
to design APIs assuming that the programmer who would 
use this API is not a security expert [5, 6, 15]. 
Due to the usability issues experienced that made the 
SCrypt implementation of Bouncycatle difficult to use, P3 
in his post task survey response mentioned that "Sincerely, 
I’d just had used SHA-256. No need to reinvent the wheel.". 
This suggests that if more secure options are provided with 
less usability, programmers would go for the less secure op- 
tions. This is an important observation and highlights why 
improving usability of security APIs is so important. This 
also agrees with the findings of Naiakshina et al. [10] where 
they identified that most programmers are not competent 
enough to select password hashing algorithms to secure their 
password stores. In organizational scenarios, organizations 
should enforce programmers to use particular hashing algo- 
rithms with enough strengths to secure their applications 
rather that expecting programmers to select algorithms. 
Even though we evaluate the SCrypt functionality of the 
Bouncycastle API, most issues we identified in this study are 
applicable to some of the other hashing implementations of 
Bouncycastle such as BCrypt. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this study, we conducted a remote behavioural usability 
study with 10 software developers to identify usability issues 
that exist in Bouncycastle SCrypt implementation. Partic- 
ipants were asked to complete a simple programming task 
where they had to develop a secure password storage using 
Bouncycastle API. They had to think aloud and record their 
screens while completing the task and once they finished the 
task, they had to answer the cognitive dimensions question- 
naire. Through the data we collected, we were able to identify 
usability issues that exist in the API. 
We mainly observed that participants faced issues while 
using the API due to complexity of SCrypt.generate() method 
parameters and due to lack of knowledge in security concepts 
such as salt. We analysed and discussed how usability issues 
we identified in this study affected the experience of program- 
mers and the security of applications they develop. We expect 
our results would help to improve usability of similar security 
APIs that will be developed to provide similar security and 
cryptographic functionalities.We also expect that this work 
will provide a guidance for researchers and software engineer- 
ing community on how to conduct usability evaluations to 
identify usability issues exist in security APIs. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Yasemin Acar, Michael Backes, Sascha Fahl, Simson Garfinkel, 
Doowon Kim, Michelle L Mazurek, and Christian Stransky. 2017. 
Comparing the usability of cryptographic apis. In Security and 
Privacy (SP), 2017 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 154–171. 
[2] Yasemin Acar, Christian Stransky, Dominik Wermke, Michelle 
Mazurek, and Sascha Fahl. 2017. Security Developer Studies with 
GitHub Users: Exploring a Convenience Sample. In Symposium 
on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS). 
[3] Tehmina Basit. 2003. Manual or electronic? The role of coding 
in qualitative data analysis.  Educational research 45, 2 (2003), 
143–154. 
[4] Felix Fischer, Konstantin Böttinger, Huang Xiao, Christian Stran- 
sky, Yasemin Acar, Michael Backes, and Sascha Fahl. 2017. Stack 
overflow considered harmful? the impact of copy&paste on an- 
droid application security. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2017 
IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 121–136. 
[5] Peter Leo Gorski and Luigi Lo Iacono. 2016. Towards the Usability 
Evaluation of Security APIs.. In HAISA. 252–265. 
[6] Matthew Green and Matthew Smith. 2016. Developers are not 
the enemy!: The need for usable security apis. IEEE Security & 
Privacy 14, 5 (2016), 40–46. 
[7] Mohit Kumar. 2017. Collection of 1.4 Billion Plain-Text Leaked 
Passwords Found Circulating Online. https://thehackernews.com/ 
2017/12/data-breach-password-list.html. (2017). Accessed: 2018- 
03-26. 
[8] Kai Mindermann. 2016. Are easily usable security libraries pos- 
sible and how should experts work together to create them?. In 
Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on cooperative 
and human aspects of software engineering. ACM, 62–63. 
[9] Samantha Murphy. 2012.  LinkedIn Confirms, Apologizes for 
Stolen  Password  Breach.     https://mashable.com/2012/06/06/ 
linkedin-passwords-hacked-confirmation/#Gs9W57eXuuqr. 
(2012). Accessed: 2018-03-26. 
[10] Alena Naiakshina, Anastasia Danilova, Christian Tiefenau, Marco 
Herzog, Sergej Dechand, and Matthew Smith. 2017. Why Do 
Developers Get Password Storage Wrong?: A Qualitative Usability 
Study. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on 
Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 311–328. 
[11] Colin Percival and Simon Josefsson. 2016. The scrypt password- 
based key derivation function.  Technical Report. 
[12] Thomas Scheller and Eva Kühn. 2015. Automated measurement 
of API usability: The API concepts framework. Information and 
Software Technology 61 (2015), 145–162. 
[13] MW Van Someren, YF Barnard, and JAC Sandberg. 1994. The 
think aloud method: a practical approach to modelling cognitive. 
(1994). 
[14] Chamila Wijayarathna, Nalin AG Arachchilage, and Jill Slay. 
2017. A Generic Cognitive Dimensions Questionnaire to Evaluate 
the Usability of Security APIs. In International Conference on 
Human Aspects of Information Security, Privacy, and Trust. 
Springer, 160–173. 
[15] Glenn Wurster and Paul C van Oorschot. 2009. The developer is 
the enemy. In Proceedings of the 2008 New Security Paradigms 
Workshop. ACM, 89–97. 
